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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-1917

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TERRELL SHIELDS,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00351-02)
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2008
Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 9, 2008)

OPINION OF THE COURT

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Terrell Shields pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with the
intent to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846, and one count of distribution of fifty or more grams of crack, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On March 19, 2007, Shields was sentenced to 120 months in
prison and a term of five years of supervised release. The sentence Shields received was
the statutory mandatory minimum sentence prescribed for the conduct to which he pled
guilty. On March 28, 2007, Shields filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Shields
argues that sentencing him to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months, which is
based on the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio in the Sentencing Guidelines, violated his rights
under the Constitution.1
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and
we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We have consistently held that neither the mandatory minimum sentences for crack
offenses, which are set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), nor the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. See
United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We have also held
that the mandatory minimum sentences and the 100:1 ratio do not violate a defendant’s
right to due process. See United States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065, 1068-70 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that a rational basis existed for the sentencing scheme relating to crack and

1

Shields suggests that the mandatory minimum sentence, because it is based on the
100:1 ratio, violates his rights to due process and freedom from cruel, unusual, and
disproportionate punishments. See Appellant’s Br. at 5. Shields also suggests that his
sentence is “fundamentally unfair” because it is based on the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio.
Id.
2

powder cocaine). Our holdings that neither the mandatory minimum sentence nor the
100:1 ratio violates the Fifth or Eighth Amendments are consistent with the positions
adopted by our sister circuits. See Alton, 60 F.3d at 1069 n.7; see also United States v.
Garcia-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 134 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that “every other circuit
has rejected the argument that the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment” and citing cases from every circuit).2
Given this Court’s precedent and the consistent position taken by our sister circuits
on these issues, we hold that sentencing Shields to the mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment based on his possession and sale of over fifty grams of crack did not
constitute a violation of his right to due process or his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.3 We further hold that Shields’ sentence is not so fundamentally
unfair as to warrant reversal.4

2

We recently affirmed that the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme and the
100:1 ratio remain viable and a component of the sentencing calculation even after the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker. See United States v. Ricks, 494
F.3d 394, 400-02 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir.
2006).
3

To the extent that Shields also challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion
to disregard the mandatory minimum, we hold that the District Court did not err in
denying the motion.
4

As we said in Ricks: “There is little disagreement that the 100-to-1 ratio
overrepresents the relative harm of crack as compared to powder cocaine. Nevertheless,
it is the role of Congress, and not the courts, to determine what crimes are worse than
others.” See Ricks, 494 F.3d at 400. Because Congress had a rational basis for creating
the scheme it did, the issue of whether punishing crack crimes more harshly than powder
cocaine crimes is “unfair” is for Congress to address. See Alton, 60 F.3d at 1069-70;
3

We have considered all other arguments made by the parties on appeal, and we
conclude that no further discussion is necessary. For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the District Court’s sentence.

Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95.
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